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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R U T H S. OLSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

15507

MORRIS F. SWAPP et al,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
Appellant instituted an action in the Davis County
District Court to enjoin Bountiful City, its officers and
agents, from building a sidewalk on the south end of
the property she and her predecessors in interest owned
and had occupied under claim of right for more than
T7 years.
1
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Bountiful had threatened to build a sidewalk on
said property under a claim of right it asserted to the
property without plaintiff's permission and without
paying or offering to pay plaintiff any compensation
therefor.
DISPOSITION BELOW
On October 30, 1971, after the trial, the District
Court signed a Judgment and Decree (R 50-51) by
which it was decreed that Bountiful City was the owner
of the property and entitled to remove any encroachments and build a sidewalk thereon. Plaintiff was also
forever barred and enjoined from asserting any title
thereto. Subsequently on June 5, 1974, the District
Court signed an Order (R 58) denying plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Findings, Make New Findings, or
in the Alternative for a New Trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the foregoing Judgment and Decree and Order of the District Court and
a Judgment directed by the Supreme Court of Utah
in appellant's favor based on the facts and the law
applicable thereto.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is based oji the
pleadings, papers and exhibits on file in the record of
2
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said case as well as on the transcript of the testimony
which was adduced at the trial.
The land in question is on the south side of appellant's property. I t is a 5 foot strip abutting immediately to the north of the existing north curb line on
Third North for the entire east-west distance between
Main and First West Streets in Bountiful, Utah.
(Actually 4.95 feet on the east side and 5.05 feet on
the west side. (Tr. 77)
The subject land has never been used as a street
or for travelling purposes. The undisputed testimony
of appellant who wras 72 at the time of trial, and of
Lamar Barlow who was 75 at the time of trial, two of
the oldest living residents of Bountiful born there and
well acquainted with the area, was that it never was a
street, that it was impassable and not open to traffic
of any kind except possibly a person on horseback or a
light buggy because it went through a creek bed (known
locally as "the hollow"). (Tr. 19-21 and 30-31)
Appellant's legal title dates back to 1872 and before. In 1872 there was a conveyance of that and other
property from the United States to the Probate Judge
of Davis County. The Probate Judge in that same year
conveyed said property to a William H . Walton. That
conveyance in 1872 to William H . Walton was pursi^ant to the claim William H . Walton had made to
said land prior thereto as his said claim was recorded
in a book brought out from the Archives of Davis
County located in the Clerk's Office. (Tr. 65*87) By
3
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various and sundry subsequent mesne conveyances of
block and lot description from William H . Walton
and others to subsequent grantees, title finally vested
in appellant. (See Exhibits J , K, L, M, N, O, P and
Q)-.
Appellant's father was James Smedley who acquired the property in 1889. (See Exhibit P ) The
plaque on the gable on the home which he built on the
property bears a date of 1893. (Exhibit D ) Thus appellant's predecessors in interest owned and occupied
the property as their residence for more than 47 years
prior to 1940 making a total continuous occupation of
the property under claim of right by appellant and her
predecessors in interest of more than 77 years.
Extensive improvements were made on the property such as barns, corrals, green houses, an orchard,
trees, hedges, a garden etc. Title to all of said property
including the existing north curb line on Third North
which bounds appellant's property on the south was
claimed by appellant's predecessors in interest and was
and is claimed by appellant. The north curb line on
Third North encloses within appellant's residential
premises a hedge, trees, gate posts and other improvements which were placed on the premises under a claim
of right and which have been used continuously by appellant and her predecessors in interest for more than
77 years. (See Exhibits A, B, C, D , E , F , H and I
and Tr. 6-11)
Bountiful City claimed title to the disputed 5 foot
strip of property solely because it is within the boun4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

daries of a platted street in a plat which hangs on the
wall in the Davis County Recorder's Office labeled
Bountiful Townsite Plat A. Particular note should be
taken of the fact however that Bountiful Gity was not
incorporated until 1892 and that the plat which accompanied the "Notice of Incorporation and Annexation
of Territory" for Bountiful City made no reference
whatsoever to roads or streets. (Tr. 50-51). In this
regard neither did the patent by which the United
States conveyed the property involved to Bountiful
City's predecessor in interest make any reference to
roads or streets. (Exhibit M)
The plat labeled Plat A hanging in the Davis
County Recorder's Office is not the original but only
a paper copy. No evidence was adduced to show when
the original was made, who made it, or as to its present
whereabouts. Neither the original of that Plat A nor
the paper copy which hangs on the wall in the Recorder's Office has ever been recorded. (Tr. 49-54)
The precise physical location on the ground of the
disputed 5 foot strip within the platted <rpaper" street
delineated as aforesaid in Plat A is then purportedly
tied in by a so called Burningham Resurvey which
was not made until 1927. Like Plat A, the Burningham
Resurvey of 1927 has never been recorded. (Tr. 49-54)
According to the only evidence adduced, the first
"time any portion of Third North, the platted "paper"
street delineated in Plat A which purportedly embraces
the disputed 5 foot strip, was ever used as a street, was
about in 1930. (Tr. 20) Until the Burningham Re5
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survey of 1927 there was nothing which could or did
give anyone any indication that the property which appellant and her predecessors in interest had claimed
and occupied to the north curb line of Third North
between Main and First West was within a platted
street. In this connection it should be noted that even
the Bountiful Resurvey of 1927 does not conform in
every respect with the assumed scale dimensions of
Bountiful Townsite Plat A. (See testimony of Don
Steven Milligan — Tr. 31-47).
Appellant also testified that in 1952 when the trees
on the property which she and her predecessors in interest occupied and claimed even farther south than the
disputed 5 foot strip were removed without her permission, the Bountiful City officials told her and represented to her that this, the north curb line of Third
North Street, was the extent of the city's claim. (Tr.
11-18)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E COURT E R R E D IN P R O H I B I T I N G
A P P E L L A N T FROM T E S T I F Y I N G FURT H E R W I T H R E F E R E N C E TO BOUNDARIES, CONDITION AND USE OF T H E
LAND OWNED, CLAIMED AND USED BY
H E R F A T H E R AN£> AS TO OTHER MATTERS OF FAMILY HISTORY.
6
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During the trial appellant tried to more fully elaborate concerning the boundary limits of the land she
now occupies and claims which is the subject matter of
this appeal as well as concerning its condition and the
use of and the improvements made thereon by her
father who was her predecessor in interest but she was
prevented from doing so. (Tr. 5-8) The court erred in
not allowing this testimony as a well recognized exception to the hearsay rule. This testimony would have
established even more conclusively that appellant should
have prevailed and that Bountiful City was not the
owner of the land. In 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 463 at page
408 it says in part:
"Under the English common law, exceptions to
the hearsay rule are made as to evidence of general custom or reputation concerning boundaries
of puplic property. Under this rule traditionary
evidence is admissible to show the boundaries of
parishes, manors, and other public estates, but
not for the purpose of proving the boundary of
a private estate where the lines are not identical
with those of a public nature. The prevailing
rule in the United States, however, is that evidence of common reputation is admissible as to
the location of a private, as well as a public,
boundary line. Ancient boundaries, corners, and
boundary trees frequently cannot be established
otherwise than by reputation, and hence, this
species of evidence is admissible of necessity
'*
(Emphasis supplied)
Later on in Sec. 581 at page 488-489:
ce

Admissions and declarations of parties are fre~K
quently admitted in evidence as competent in qte^

7
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termining questions relating to title, ownership,
and possession of property, both real and personal (Emphasis supplied)
*

*

*

". . . It is generally recognized that the declarations of one claiming title to real estate by adverse possession or of his predecessors in possession, during the statutory period, are admissible
to show the nature of his possession and claim
of ownership
"
See also in this connection Wigmore, 3rd Ed., Sec.
1582.
POINT I I
BASED ON T H E FACTS IN T H E RECORD AND T H E LAW
APPLICABLE
T H E R E T O , T H E COURT E R R E D IN DISMISSING T H E COMPLAINT AND IN ADJ U D I C A T I N G T H A T BOUNTIFUL CITY
WAS T H E R I G H T F U L OWNER OF T H E
D I S P U T E D PROPERTY.
The facts iji this case and in the case of Hall v.
North Ogden City, 166 P.2d 221, rehearing granted
and judgment set aside 175 P.2d 703 (1946) are strikingly similar, When the extremely important distinction in the facts is considered, it is even more convincing
that the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint and in adjudicating that Bountiful City was the
owner of the disputed 5 foot strip of land.
8
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In each case the respective plaintiff tried to enjoin
the municipality, North Ogden in the Hall case and
Bountiful City in this case, from opening up land it
claimed title to because it was within the boundaries of
a platted street. In each case the land came originally
from the United States by patent under the Federal
Townsite Act, 14 Stat. 541 and then by subsequent
mesne conveyances by block and lot description until
the legal title to the land vested in the respective claimants. The important distinction is that in the Hall
case, at the time of the conveyance by patent from the
United States there was a plat in existence showing
designated streets while in this case there is no evidence
whatsoever that at the time of the conveyance by patent
from the United States there was such a plat in existence showing designated streets.
The Court in the first Hall case, in reciting some
of the undisputed facts said at page 222 of 166 P2d:
"Plaintiffs and appellants instituted this suit to
enjoin the town of North Ogden and its officials
from opening up as streets certain tracts of land
indicated as streets by the plat of the survey of
the townsite of North Ogden filed April 27,
1870. On August 2, 1872, by patent, the United
States conveyed to Franklin D . Richards,
County Judge of Weber County, Utah, "in
trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants of the Town of North Ogden, Weber
. County, Utah Territory, according to their respective interests", certain lands in Township 7
North, Range 1 West, in Weber County, which
lands were embraced within the area of lands

9
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platted as the townsite of North Ogden into lots,
blocks and streets. The patent recited that it was
executed in accordance with the provisions of
the act of Congress of April 24, 1820, and the
act of Congress approved March 2, 1867, entitled "An Act for the Relief of Inhabitants of
Cities and Towns upon the Public Lands," commonly known as the Federal Townsite Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
The conveyance by patent in the Hall case refers to
streets. Unlike the Hall case the facts in this case show
that on May 2, 1872, pursuant to the Townsite and
related acts, the United States by patent conveyed ajl
of the land including the disputed land to the Probate
Judge " . . . in trust for the several use and benefit of
the inhabitants of the Townsite of Bountiful Davis
County Utah Territory . . . " After setting forth the
legal description of the land being conveyed by township, range, block etc., the patent continued:
". . . according to the Official Plat of the survey
of said lands returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General, which said tracts
have been purchased by the said Hector C.
Haight, Probate Judge, as aforesaid . . . " (Exhibit M)
The survey referred to in the foregoing patent was
not introduced into evidence and is not part of the record in this case. No streets are mentioned in that
patent. Undoubtedly the survey referred to in that
patent, like the survey which accompanied tl^e Bountiful City incorporation notice (Tr. 50-riJl), described
the land only by township, range, section, block etc.,
10
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similarly to what most cadastral surveys do.
are not mentioned.

Streets

In both the Hall case and in this case some of the
witnesses who testified were some of the oldest residents
who were born, raised and lived in the area. They knew
the property as long as they knew any property. They
knew and testified that the disputed land had never
been used as a street and that the respective plaintiffs
and their predecessors in interest had occupied tha disputed land as long as persons of their respective ages
could remember. Under those facts, Justice Wade who
wrote the dissenting opinion in the first Hall case
which later became the law in Utah when the first Hall
case was reversed by the second Hall case said:
". . . The foregoing facts require the conclusion
that plaintiff's predecessors in interest were occupying the portions of the lands which were
platted as streets and which they now occupy,
at the time the Townsite was entered by the
County Judge for the benefit of the occupants
thereof. Any opposing conclusion would be unreasonable. . . . "
Justice Wade then went on to discuss the provisions of
the Townsite Act and the related Act which was
adopted by the Territorial Legislature saying further:
"There are many cases which have interpreted
this Federal statute, including some from the
Supreme Court of the United States, in cases
very similar to this one, and they have held without exception that at the time of the entry of the
land of the townsite the occupants thereof have
11
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a vested right to the use of the streets and alleys
then existing and being used, and that each of
such occupants at that time becomes to the extent
of the lands which he then occupied the beneficiary of the trust created by the act and was then
vested with the equitable ownership of the land
which he then occupied, and that while the execution of the trust was subject to the rules and
regulations of the territorial Legislature, neither
by such rules nor by any act of the trustee could
the beneficiary be divested of his rights which
accrued to him under the act of Congress at the
time of the entry, of the townsite was made.
Such cases further hold that the filing and recording of a map or plat of the townsite either in
accordance with the territorial regulations or
otherwise, which showed no street to exist where
one existed and was then being used by the occupants at the time of the entry, or which showed
a street or alley to exist over lands or a part
thereof which was then occupied by a settler,
could not divest the settlers of the right to use
the street or alley which existed and were being
used at the time of the entry, nor divest the occupant of his vested equitable ownership of all
of the lands then occupied by him, and any attempt to do so would be null and void. (Numerous cases cited) (^Emphasis supplied)
Later on in that first Hall case which was reversed and
which dissenting opinion of Justice Wade became the
law in Utah, Justice Wade said at page 229:
" . . . Nor did the city or town of North Ogden
obtain the right to take for public streets the
Ljtnd in question without compensation. . . ."
12
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In reversing the first Hall case and rendering its
decision in favor of the plaintiff in the second Hall
case the court referred to and quoted from the case of
City of Globe v. Slack, 11 Ariz. 408, 95 P . 126.
The Globe case is exactly in point with one phase of
this case. In the Globe case like in the instant case
there was no plat of streets until after the entry. The
plat showing designated streets was made after the
entry and after the land platted as a street was already
occupied and claimed. In mentioning the Globe case
the court said at page 710 of 175 P2d:
"The case of City of Globe v. Slack, supra, as to
this phase of the case is exactly in point. The
Globe townsite was entered in 1882, and thereafter the lands thereof were platted into lots,
blocks and streets. When the entry was made
one McDowell was occupying what was later
platted as Lot 1 in Block 74, and the lands adjoining it were platted as a street, he had a residence on the lot and a barn and closet on what
was platted as a street. The trustee deeded to
him the lot which he was occupying but did not
include therein the land which he was occupying
which was platted as a street and he accepted
such deed and paid the fee therefor. Thereafter,
McDowell sold and conveyed to plaintiff Slack
his interests. In the deed he described the land
only as Lot 1 in Block 74, but did not describe
the lands which were platted as a street, but
Slack took possession of the lands occupied by
McDowell which were platted as a street as weil
as the lands in the lot, and later built a fence
around all of them. The lands platted as a street
which were occupied by McDowell were never
13
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used for street purposes, the city threatened to
enter and open up the street thereon and Slack
sued to enjoin the city therefrom. In holding in
favor of Slack the court said (11 Ariz. 480, 95
P.127):
"Neither the act of Congress nor that of the territorial Legislature specifically make provision
for the dedication of streets, nor for the disposal
by probate judge of any part of the lands for
other public purposes. The occupants, however,
had a vested interest in the streets and alleys as
they existed at the time the townsite was entered,
and the trustee had no authority to destroy them.
(Citing Ashby v. Hall, supra). But no authority
was given to establish new ones. . . . In attempting to create additional streets, however desirable
such a general plan may have been, they exceeded their authority, and the streets which they
platted, existing only on paper, were not lawfully established. (Citing cases). Nor does it
appear that there has been any dedication of the
land for street purposes by the occupants.
Bountiful City hasn't claimed nor could it possibly claim that appellant ever affirmatively or by acquiescence dedicated the disputed 5 foot strip on the
south end of her property as a public street. Accordingly, it ;s not necessary to review and analyze the balance of the thrust of the decision in the Hall case supra
which appellant submits is controlling in this case.
POIJNT I I I
T H E COURT E R R E D IN D E N Y I N G
P L A I N T I F F ' S M O T I O N TO A M E N D F I N D 14
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I N G S , M A K E N E W F I N D I N G S , OR I N T H E
ALTERNATVE FOR A N E W TRIAL.
The trial of the case on appeal here was held and
concluded on July 30, 1971. On October 30, 1971, the
court made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 46-49) as well as the Judgment
and Decree based thereon. (R. 50-51) Thereafter
plaintiff-appellant timely filed a "Motion To Amend
Findings, Make New Findings, or in the alternative,
for a New Trial". (R. 52-55) The court didn't rule
on this Motion until approximately three years later
when on June 5, 1974, the court summarily denied that
Motion in all respects. (R. 58)
Appellant respectfully submits that the requested
findings are supported by ample, competent evidence
in the record and that an objective analysis of the case
and a proper determination of the case justifies that
they be made. The failure of the court to make the
requested findings constitutes reversible error.
P O I N T IV
BOUNTIFUL CITY SHOULD BE ESTOPP E D F R O M A S S E R T I N G A N Y C L A I M TO
T H E DISPUTED LAND AND APPELLANT
SHOULD NOT BE D I S T U R B E D IN H E R
P E A C E A B L E P O S S E S S I O N A N D OCCUPATION UNLESS B O U N T I F U L CITY PROC E E D S TO T A K E S A I D L A N D I N A P R O P E R
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING.
15
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Appellant is well aware of the conflict which exists
in the cases as to whether the right of the public to
land dedicated for a street or highway may be extinguished by nonuser or adverse possession due to
laches, negligence or nonaction of city authorities. However, many courts do recognize and apply the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.
In the case of Oliver v. Synhorst, 86 Pac. 376, 48
Or. 292, (1906) the Supreme Court of Oregon applied the doctrine in a case which was instituted to enjoin the city street superintendent from removing or
interfering with a fence and sidewalk or in any manner
destroying or interfering with plaintiff's shade trees,
ornamental trees and shrubbery on the disputed property. During the course of its decision the court said at
page 378:
". . . for more than 13 years the plaintiff an4
her grantor have been in the open, exclusive, and
peaceable possession of the strip of land now in
controversy, and that they have made, without
objection from the city authorities, valuable and
permanent improvements thereon in good faith,
believing that they were the owners thereof. The
question for decision is whether, by reason of
these facts, the city is now estopped to assert that
the true street line is other than where the plaintiff's fence is located."
The court answered the question by going on to say:'
". . . while the rule may be that the
statute of limitations as such cannot be
defeat tjie right of the public to the
street or highway, there may grow up,

ordinary
set up to
use of a
in conse-
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quence of the laches of the public authorities,
private rights of more persuasive force in the
particular case than that of the public, and if
"acts are done by an adjoining proprietor which
indicate that he is in good faith claiming as his
own that which is, in fact, a part of the highway,
as he supposes or claims it to be, the public will
be estopped." (Cases cited)
The Supreme Court of Oregon also applied the doctrine
of estoppel in the case of Dabney v. City of Portland,
263 Pac. 386, 124 Ore, 54 (1928) wherein during the
course of the decision the court said at page 388:
"We think the doctrine of estoppel in pais applied. . . .
*
*
*
"Where there has been long-continued nonuser
by a municipality, and valuable and permanent
improvements have been made with its consent or
acquiescence, in good faith, equity will not permit
the city to change its position to the material
damage of the person thus misled. The groundwork of equitable estoppel is a species of
fraud...."
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is recognized by
the Supreme Court of Utah. In the cases of Tpoele
City v, Elkington, 117 P2d 406, 100 Utah 485, Hall
v. North Ogden City supra, and Cox v. Carlisle, Mayor
of Manti City, 359 P2d 1049, 11 Utah 2d 372 the doctrine was held not to be applicable but it was applied
in Premium Oil v„ Cedar City, 187 P2d 199, 112 Utah
213 and in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 168 P 766, 50 Utah
593o In the Wall case supra the court refused to allow
Salt Lake City to open Eighth South Street to the
17
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full dedicated width because of the conduct of the cityofficials and agents in permitting the abutting owner
to expend money and effort on improvements which
extended into the platted dedicated street.
If necessary the doctrine of equitable estoppel
should be applied in this case and Bountiful City
should be estopped from asserting any claim to the disputed property for several reasons. First, as detailed
in the argument of Point I I , Bountiful City never acquired legal title to the disputed 5 foot strip. Second,
Bountiful City hasn't claimed nor could it possibly
claim any right thereto by virtue of a purported dedication of it as a public street by appellant. And finally,
because of Bountiful's long acquiescence of the use and
occupation of the disputed property by appellant and
her predecessors in interest who erected many valuable
improvements thereon as well as because of the affirmative representations which the officials of Bountiful
made to appellant that the north curb line of Third
North between Main and First West Streets constituted the full extent of Bountiful's claim to the southern portion of appellant's property.
CONCLUSION
I t is respectfully submitted that under the facts
and applicable law the decision of the lower court should
be reversed and the case remanded with a mandate that
judgment be entered in favor of appellant.
Q U E N T I N L. R. A L S T O N
Attorney for plaintiff-appellant.
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